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Introduction 
An early form of workers’ compensation was depicted in 
Alexander O. Exquemelin’s 1678 account of Caribbean buccaneers.1 
According to Exquemelin, the buccaneers drew up “an agreement or 
chasse partie” as to how to divide the loot up amongst officers, crew 
members, and crew members wounded during the voyage.2 This early 
form of workers’ compensation awarded either six hundred pieces of 
eight or six slaves for the loss of a right arm.3 If a man were to lose 
the use of his arm he would be awarded the same amount as if the 
arm had been severed.4 And for “a severe internal injury which meant 
the victim had to have a pipe inserted in his body [he] would earn 500 
pieces of eight or five slaves in recompense.”5 The injured buccaneer’s 
share was first withdrawn from the total amount to ensure that the 
injured man was cared for before the remaining loot was divided up 
amongst the remaining crew members.6 
The buccaneers’ early form of workers’ compensation predates the 
American system by over three centuries. Workers’ compensation pro-
grams did not arise in the United States until the Twentieth 
 
1. Alexander O. Exquemelin, The Buccaneers of America (Alexis 
Brown trans., Dover Publ’ns 2000) (1678). 
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Century.7 Workers’ compensation developed support as a type of 
grand bargain between the employee and the employer. Under this 
system, an injured employee agreed to surrender their common-law 
right to sue for damages that fell within the scope of workers’ 
compensation in exchange for specific guaranteed benefits.8 Beginning 
in the 1980s there was an increase in legislation that was intended to 
curb the increasing costs of workers’ compensation programs.9 By 
1997, over two-thirds of states passed legislation that tended to curb 
the rising costs by decreasing both the right to compensation and the 
amount of benefits an injured worker is entitled to receive.10 
The call for legislative reform to traditional state-run workers’ 
compensation programs continues today. Support has increased within 
the last few years for alternative “opt-out” programs in response to 
the perceived failings of the state-run programs regarding both rising 
costs and decreased benefits.11 Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, 
and Florida proposed legislation that would create alternative opt-out 
programs to the traditional state-run programs.12 In 2013, Oklahoma 
became the second state in the country to pass legislation creating an 
alternative to the traditional state-run workers’ compensation pro-
grams.13 Supporters like John D. Doak, the Oklahoma Insurance Com-
missioner, assert that alternative plans cut costs while increasing the 
 
7. Lex K. Larson & Arthur Larson, Workers’ Compensation Law 21 
(5th ed. 2013) (observing that the legislatures of New York, Massachusetts, 
Minnesota, New Jersey, Connecticut, Ohio, Illinois, Wisconsin, Montana, and 
Washington had created commissions to investigate workers’ compensation 
legislation by 1910). 
8. Id. at 4. 
9. Id. at 25 (noting that rising costs were associated with a combination of 
factors including medical care; an increase in number, length, and 
litigiousness of proceedings; attorney involvement; and the perception of 
widespread fraud amongst workers). 
10. Id. 
11. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, Inside Corporate America’s Campaign to 
Ditch Workers’ Comp, ProPublica (Oct. 14, 2015), https://www. 
propublica.org/article/inside-corporate-americas-plan-to-ditch-workers-comp 
[https://perma.cc/ZV4E-WVZ5]; Michael Moline, House Freshman’s Work-
ers’ Comp Bill Would Render System Voluntary, Fla. Pol. (Dec. 7, 2016), 
http://floridapolitics.com/archives/228432-workers-comp-4 [https://perma 
.cc/RPG3-E9LV]. 
12. See, e.g., S.B. 1062, 54th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2013); H.B. 4197, 121st Sess. 
(S.C. 2015); H.B. 997, 109th Gen. Assemb. (Tenn. 2015). The Florida bill 
referenced in the previous footnote has yet to be filed officially. 
13. Zeke Campfield, Oklahoma State Senate Approves Workers’ Comp Overhaul, 
NewsOK (Feb. 27, 2013), http://newsok.com/article/3759633 [https:// 
perma.cc/Q2AM-LSVQ]. 
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competitiveness of the workers’ compensation insurance market.14 Pro-
ponents allege that private alternative plans decrease costs for com-
panies.15 In 2016, Oklahoma reported a decrease for the fourth year in 
a row according to the state insurance program.16 In 2016, the 
National Council on Compensation Insurance in Oklahoma filed an 
overall loss cost decrease of 10.2% for workers’ compensation.17 
Supporters credit the decrease in Oklahoma’s workers’ compensation 
costs to declines in market experience, market trend, and recent 
reforms to traditional workers’ compensation programs.18 A recent 
study by Alison Morantz, a Stanford law professor, supports the 
proponents’ claims and found that companies saved around forty-four 
percent when they replaced traditional workers’ compensation 
programs with private plans.19 
In September 2016, the Oklahoma Supreme Court dealt a striking 
blow to supporters of opt-out programs when it held that the 
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act20 (OEIBA) was 
 
14. Specifically, Doak claimed that the 2013 workers’ compensation reforms 
enacted in 2013 were accomplished by replacing “an outdated adversarial 
court system with the Workers’ Compensation Commission, increas[ing] the 
competitiveness of our workers’ compensation insurance markets, and de-
velop[ing] an innovative solution to workplace injuries,” resulting in annually 
decreasing costs. Stephanie K. Jones, Oklahoma Supreme Court Rules Work-
ers’ Comp Opt-Out Unconstitutional, Ins. J. (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www. 
insurancejournal.com/news/southcentral/2016/09/14/426439.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/8FGP-ZAVC]. 
15. See Joanne Sammer, Opting Out: Are Alternative Workers’ Comp Programs 
Viable?, Soc’y for Human Resource Mgmt. (Sept. 1, 2016), https:// 
www.shrm.org/hr-today/news/hr-magazine/0916/pages/opting-out-are-
alternative-workers'-comp-programs-viable.aspx [https://perma.cc/8JPU-
QLSX] (“From an employer’s standpoint, opt-out plans could reduce their 
expenses substantially.”). 





19. Alison Morantz analyzed injury and illness claims filed by employees of fif-
teen Texas companies from 1998 to 2010. She found that the decrease in 
costs was due to a decrease in the frequency of serious claims regarding re-
placement of lost wages and a decline in the overall costs associated with 
each claim. Alison D. Morantz, Rejecting the Grand Bargain: What Happens 
When Large Companies Opt Out of Workers’ Compensation? 47–48 (Stan-
ford Law Sch., John M. Olin Program in Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 
488, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2750134 [https://perma.cc/TGH8-
98TX]. 
20. 2013 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. Ch. 208, § 107 (West) (codified at Okla. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 85a, § 200 (West 2017)). 
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unconstitutional.21 The Oklahoma Supreme Court’s decision does not 
end the debate surrounding opt-out legislation.22 Going forward, 
Texas provides a model for states looking to enact alternative 
programs, while Oklahoma provides a cautionary tale. Part I of this 
Comment focuses on a brief history of workers’ compensation in the 
United States. Part II focuses on Oklahoma’s system of workers’ 
compensation and their implementation of an alternative opt-out 
program. Part III focuses on the opt-out program in Texas and how it 
survived constitutional challenges, while Part IV analyzes whether the 
opt-out programs can be emulated in states where the existing system 
was created by a constitutional provision. 
I. A Brief History of the Grand Bargain 
Workers’ compensation in the United States arose as a result of 
increasing industrialization in the Nineteenth Century and the 
influence of systems created in Germany and England.23 Beginning in 
the early 1900s, various state commissions began investigations into 
workers’ compensation.24 Under the “industrial,” or “grand,” bargain, 
employees gave up the common law right to bring a negligence action 
against their employer in return for a predetermined amount of 
benefits.25 In 1910, the Uniform Workmen’s Compensation Law was 
drafted during a Chicago conference26 and New York adopted a type 
of compulsory workers’ compensation system.27 
In 1911, however, the Court of Appeals in Ives v. South Buffalo 
Railway Co.,28 held the New York system to be an unconstitutional 
taking by imposing liability upon employers regardless of fault.29 In 
response to the Ives Court’s holding, the New York legislature passed 
a constitutional amendment, effective January 1, 1914, which 
 
21. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2016 OK 89, 381 P.3d 768. 
22. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the increased support 
for alternative opt-out programs). 
23. Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 20–21. 
24. Id. at 21. 
25. Parret v. UNICCO Serv. Co., 2005 OK 54, ¶ 20, 127 P.3d 572, 578, super-
seded by Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85a, § 5 (West 2017). 
26. Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 21. 
27. Id. See Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 674, 1910 N.Y. Laws 1945. 
28. 94 N.E. 431 (1911). 
29. See id. at 448 (holding that “[a]ll that it is necessary to affirm in the case 
before us is that in our view of the Constitution of our state the liability 
sought to be imposed upon the employers enumerated in the statute before 
us is a taking of property without due process of law, and the statue is 
therefore void”). 
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permitted a mandatory workers’ compensation system.30 The new 
workers’ compensation law, passed after the amendment, took effect 
on July 1, 1914, and provided for an exclusive remedy for injured 
workers who, in lieu of a jury trial, would receive a set, predetermined 
amount.31 Compensation for injured workers was to be provided 
regardless of fault unless the injured worker intended to injure or 
cause the death of himself or another worker or if the injury was 
solely due to the injured employee being intoxicated.32 
The new law establishing an exclusive remedy for injured workers 
was challenged in N.Y. Central Railroad Co. v. White33 as a violation 
of the Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment rights and limiting the free-
dom to contract.34 In a 9–0 decision, the United States Supreme Court 
held that New York’s law did not violate equal protection or due 
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment, nor did it limit 
freedom of contract.35 This ruling paved the way for the expansion of 
workers’ compensation in other states, and forty states adopted some 
form of compensation acts by 1920.36 Mississippi became the last of 
the then existing forty-eight states to enact a workers’ compensation 
system in 1949.37 In the subsequent years, workers’ compensation 
coverage was extended by adding jurisdictions and broadening the 
 
30. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 195–96 (1917) (“Nothing con-
tained in this constitution shall be construed to limit the power of the legis-
lature . . . to provide that the right of such compensation, and the remedy 
therefor shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies for injuries to 
employees or for death resulting from such injuries; or to provide that the 
amount for such compensation for death shall not exceed a fixed or deter-
minable sum . . . .”). 
31. See Act of December 16, 1913, ch. 816, 1913 N.Y. Laws 2277 (enacting the 
legislation); Act of January 8, 1914, ch. 41, 1914 N.Y. Laws 216 
(reenacting the legislation); N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 208–09 
(holding that the New York law was constitutional); see also The N.Y. 
State Workers’ Comp. Bd., The New York State Workers’ 
Compensation Board Centennial 6–7 (2014), 
www.wcb.ny.gov/WCB_Centenial_Booklet 
.pdf [https://perma.cc/FB87-DP6M] (discussing the adoption of New 
York’s workers’ compensation law). 
32. N.Y. Cent. R.R. Co., 243 U.S. at 202. 
33. 243 U.S. 188 (1917). 
34. Id. at 191, 206. 
35. Id. at 206–08 (holding that “the authority to prohibit contracts made in 
derogation of a lawfully established policy of the state respecting 
compensation for accidental death or disabling personal injury is . . . clear” 
and that “the prescribed scheme of compulsory compensation is not 
repugnant to the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
36. Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 23. 
37. Id. 
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boundaries of individual acts including people, employment, and the 
kinds of injury, including occupational disease.38 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act.39 This law created the National Commission on State Workmen’s 
Compensation Laws.40 The Commission was composed of fifteen mem-
bers appointed by the President tasked with evaluating current pro-
grams and making recommendations for improvement.41 The 
Commission submitted their final report detailing the inadequacies of 
existing programs in 1972.42 The Commission made a large number of 
recommendations for improvement in their report, including: 
[C]ompulsory coverage in all acts; elimination of all numerical 
and occupational exemptions to coverage, including domestic 
and farm labor; full coverage of work-related diseases; full 
medical and physical rehabilitation services without arbitrary 
limits; a broad extra-territoriality provision; elimination of 
arbitrary limits on duration or total sum of benefits; and a 
weekly benefit maximum that rises from an immediate 66 2/3 
percent to an ultimate 200 percent of average weekly wage in 
the state.43 
The Commission recommended a three year time frame for states to 
comply with the recommendations before federal intervention to 
ensure compliance would begin.44 In the ten years following the 
Commission’s report, state legislation on workers’ compensation 
greatly expanded benefits, including unlimited medical benefits and 
occupational disease coverage, while an increasing number of 
employees were covered.45 The number of covered workers expanded 
by at least five percentage points in almost half of states between 
1968 and 1976.46 
 
38. Id. at 23–24. In spite of the expansion of the workers’ compensation system, 
not all workers were covered under it. For example, domestic and agricul-
tural workers, small firms, and casual workers were still excluded from the 
system. Id. at 24. 
39. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91–596, 84 Stat. 
1590 (1970). 






46. Daniel N. Price, Workers’ Compensation Program in the 1970’s, 42 Soc. 
Sec. Bull. 3, 7 (1979) (pointing out that in 1976, the proportion of covered 
workers had risen by at least five percentage points from the 1968 numbers 
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Perhaps the marked increase in expanded state coverage through-
out the 1970s can be attributed to the looming possibility of federal 
intervention in the event that the Commission’s minimum 
recommended standards were not met. Throughout the 1970s, federal 
legislators introduced various bills that were designed to make states 
meet the Commission’s minimum standard.47 None of these bills 
passed through Congress, but the possibility of federal intervention 
lingered over states if they failed to comply.48 By the 1980s, state 
focus shifted from achieving the Commission’s established standards 
and turned toward specific problems like asbestos-related diseases.49 In 
the mid to late 1980s, state focus once again shifted—this time to 
curtailing employers’ rising costs related to workers’ compensation.50 
By 1997, over two-thirds of states had enacted legislation aimed at 
decreasing workers’ compensation costs through a variety of measures 
while making it more difficult for injured workers to recover for 
preexisting conditions, repetitive motion injuries, or stress-related 
cases.51 The focus on cost reduction continues today with a rise in 
proposed legislation to allow employers to opt out of state-run 
workers’ compensation programs and instead create alternative 
private plans.52 
II. Workers’ Compensation in Oklahoma 
Workers’ compensation was designed to provide injured workers 
and their families with “a living and prevent them from becoming 
public charges.”53 The Oklahoma legislature created the Oklahoma 
Workers’ Compensation Commission, which applies the 
Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act54 (AWCA) to employers 
 
in thirteen states, while a similar increase was seen in eleven other states 
between 1972 and 1976). 
47. Larson & Larson, supra note 7, at 24–25. 
48. Id. at 24. 
49. Id. at 24–25. 
50. Id. at 25. 
51. See id. (“[C]hanges commonly found in this legislation include (1) restrictions 
on the right of the claimant to choose his or her medical provider, (2) utili-
zation of managed care, (3) anti-fraud provisions, (4) measures designed to 
reduce attorney involvement at the administrative level, (5) measures 
designed to encourage early resolution of claims, and (6) measures designed 
to reduce duplicate recovery among different reimbursement systems.”). 
52. See Grabell & Berkes, supra note 11. 
53. Corbin v. Wilkinson, 52 P.2d 45, 48 (Okla. 1935). 
54. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 1 (West 2017). 
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and employees.55 Currently, the AWCA applies to both employers and 
employees in Oklahoma.56 Nearly all employees in Oklahoma are 
covered under the AWCA, with the exception of a few select groups.57 
For example, employees whose employment is casual, or required due 
to conviction of a criminal offense or incarceration, are not covered.58 
Additionally, employees covered by another workers’ compensation 
system are not covered under the AWCA, nor are certain agricultural 
and horticultural workers, some licensed real estate sales associates 
and brokers, volunteers, and some domestic workers.59 
Under Oklahoma law, the rights and remedies guaranteed to em-
ployees under the AWCA are exclusive of all other rights and 
remedies, so a covered employee does not have a right to tort 
damages.60 The exclusive remedy guaranteeing injured workers 
compensation does not apply if, however, an intentional tort 
committed by the employer caused the injury61 or if the employer fails 
to pay the employee compensation as required by law.62 If the 
employer fails to pay the injured employee compensation due under 
the AWCA, the employee can either make a claim for compensation 
under the AWCA or file a claim for civil damages in an Oklahoma 
district court.63 Additionally, if an employer commits an intentional 
tort, an employee has a right to file for civil damages in a district 
court.64 Under the AWCA, an employee cannot agree to waive his or 
her right to compensation through any contract, regulation, or 
device.65 Oklahoma law further prevents employers from 
discriminating or retaliating against an employee who engages in 
protected activity under the AWCA.66 
 
55. Okla. Admin. Code § 810:1-1-3 (2017). 
56. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 3(A) (West 2017). 
57. Id. § 2(18).  
58. Id. § 2(18)(a). 
59. Id. § 2(18).  
60. Id. § 5(A). 
61. Id. § 5(B)(2). 
62. Id. § 5(B)(1). 
63. Id. § 5(D). 
64. Id. § 5(I). Under Oklahoma law, an intentional tort exists only if the injury 
occurs because of “willful, deliberate, specific intent” on behalf of the 
employer against the employee. Id. § 5(B)(2). 
65. Id. § 8(A).  
66. Id. § 7(A).  
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Before 2013, Oklahoma workers were covered under the Workers’ 
Compensation Code.67 But, in 2013, this was repealed in favor of the 
Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act,68 which adopted the Ok-
lahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act.69 The constitutional challenges 
began soon thereafter. On November 25, 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme 
Court heard a constitutional challenge in Coates v. Fallin.70 There, 
the Court held that absent a clear constitutional defect it would 
uphold the OEIBA because it is not the duty of the Court to rewrite 
statutes “merely because the legislation does not comport with our 
concept of prudent public policy.”71  
The OEIBA was modeled upon its Texas counterpart’s program 
to allow employers to opt out of the state-run system of workers’ com-
pensation. Under the OEIBA, employers could draft their own worker 
compensation laws and decide which injuries the policies would 
cover.72 The OEIBA also permitted employers to limit injured 
employees to certain physicians and how workers obtained 
compensation from the employer as well as how disputes would be 
handled.73 Although the general premise of the Oklahoma and Texas 
opt-out plans are the same, there are several key differences which 
permitted the opt-out plan to survive in Texas despite a similar act 
being overturned in Oklahoma. First, Oklahoma had an existing state 
mandated workers’ compensation program74 whereas Texas never had 
a mandatory program.75 Secondly, as the Oklahoma Supreme Court 
would ultimately hold, the OEIBA did not guarantee all Oklahoma 
workers’ the same rights when a work-related injury occurred.76 
Instead, the OEIBA allowed for employers to single out injured 
 
67. Workers' Compensation Code, ch. 318, 2011 Okla. Sess. Laws 2553, (repealed 
2013). 
68. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 1 (West 2014). 
69. Id. § 3. 
70. 2013 OK 108, 316 P.3d 924. 
71. Id. ¶ 2, 316 P.3d at 924. 
72. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 2(9)(a)–(g) (West 2013). 
73. Id. 
74. Title 85A. Workers’ Compensation, Okla. St. Courts Network, http: 
//www.oscn.net/applications/oscn/Index.asp?ftdb=STOKSTB1&level=1 
[https://perma.cc/6BZ3-FQFZ] (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).  
75. Morantz, supra note 19, at 47–48.  
76. Vasquez v. Dillard’s, Inc., 2016 OK 89, ¶ 19, 381 P.3d 768, 773 (“The Opt 
Out Act does not guarantee members of the subject class, all employees, the 
same rights when a work related injury occurs. Rather, it provides employers 
the authority to single out their injured employees for inequitable treat-
ment.”). 
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employees for “inequitable treatment.”77 The OEIBA expressly stated 
that employers are not bound by the Oklahoma Workers’ 
Compensation Act unless expressly incorporated within the OEIBA.78 
The OEIBA also failed to eliminate the exclusive remedy provision 
that is found within the AWCA.79 
There were several constitutional challenges to the OEIBA. In 
December 2013, the Oklahoma Supreme Court held the OEIBA to be 
constitutional despite being challenged in Coates v. Fallin.80 On Sep-
tember 13, 2016, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court struck down 
the OEIBA as unconstitutional in Vasquez v. Dillard’s.81 The Vasquez 
Court held that the legislation created two disparate classes of 
workers and resulted in an “unconstitutional special law” under the 
Oklahoma Constitution.82 In Vasquez, the Court analyzed the issue of 
whether the statute was a special law with a three-part test. The 
Court’s analysis turned on: (1) whether the law was special or general, 
(2) if it was a special law, then if a general law applied, and (3) if 
there was no applicable general law, then was the special law 
constitutionally permissible.83 Under the Oklahoma Constitution, 
 
77. Id. 
78. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 203(B) (West 2015) (“The benefit plan shall 
provide for payment of the same forms of benefits included in the Adminis-
trative Workers’ Compensation Act for temporary total disability . . . dis-
figurement, amputation or permanent total loss of use of a scheduled mem-
ber, death and medical benefits as a result of an occupational injury, on a 
no-fault basis, and with dollar, percentage and duration limits . . . contained 
in Sections 45, 46 and 47 of this title. For this purpose, the standards for 
determination of average weekly wage, death beneficiaries, and disability 
under the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act shall apply under the 
Oklahoma Employee Injury Benefit Act; but no other provision of the Ad-
ministrative Workers’ Compensation Act defining covered injuries, medical 
management, dispute resolution or other process, funding, notices or penal-
ties shall apply or otherwise be controlling under the Oklahoma Employee 
Injury Benefit Act, unless expressly incorporated.”). 
79. Id. § 5(A) (West 2014) (“The rights and remedies granted to an employee 
subject to the provisions of the Administrative Workers’ Compensation Act 
shall be exclusive of all other rights and remedies of the employee . . . .”). 
80. Coates v. Fallin, 2013 OK 108, ¶ 3, 316 P.3d 924, 925 (holding that “Senate 
Bill 1062, 2013 Okla. Sess. Laws, Ch. 208 is not unconstitutional as a 
multiple-subject bill and that the Legislature has exercised proper authority 
in a matter over which it has the power to act by adopting a code for the 
future execution of workers’ compensation law in Oklahoma which comports 
with the Okla. Const. art. 5, 57”). 
81. 2016 OK 89, 381 P.3d 768. 
82. Id. (holding that “[t]he core provision of the Opt Out Act . . . creates im-
permissible, unequal, disparate treatment of a select group of injured work-
ers”). 
83. Id. ¶ 11, 381 P.3d at 772. 
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“[l]aws of a general nature shall have a uniform operation throughout 
the State, and where a general law can be made applicable, no special 
law shall be enacted.”84 The Vasquez Court held that a special law is 
one that has different treatment for “less than an entire class of 
similarly affected person or things” whereas a general law applies to 
all members of a class.85 Dillard’s argued that the statutory class 
created by the OEIBA was all Oklahoma employers rather than 
injured employees.86 Dillard’s relied on Grimes v. City of Oklahoma 
City87 in support of their proposition.88 The Vasquez Court, however, 
distinguished Grimes from the issue at bar because Grimes looked to 
the title of the legislative act in determining the protected class and 
did not deal with workers’ compensation.89 In Vasquez, unlike Grimes, 
the title of the OEIBA was aimed at employees and did not address 
employers.90 The Vasquez court further held that the legislative intent 
behind the OEIBA was that the intended class were injured 
employees rather than employers.91 
In Vasquez, Dillard’s argued that the OEIBA was constitutionally 
valid even if it was found to be a special law since it was 
“substantially and reasonably related to a legitimate government 
objective.”92 Dillard’s argued that the OEIBA allowed for a “more 
effective system of identifying and treating workplace injuries; 
improving access to medical treatment; improving worker health and 
safety; and encouraging job creation.”93 Dillard’s further contended 
that to accomplish the aforementioned goals, the Oklahoma 
Legislature gave employers the ability to implement the benefits to 
their employees.94 The Court, however, was not persuaded by 
Dillard’s argument. The Court was unwilling to “accept the invitation 
of employers to find a discriminatory state statue constitutional by 
 
84. Okla. Const. art. 5, § 59. 
85. Vasquez, ¶ 12, 381 P.3d at 772. 
86. Id. ¶ 15, 381 P.3d at 772. 
87. 2002 OK 47, 49 P.3d 719 (upholding a municipality’s right to choose how to 
financially support schools within the city limits against a special law att-
ack). 
88. Vasquez, ¶ 16, 381 P.3d at 772. 
89. Id. ¶¶ 17–18, 381 P.3d at 772–73. The legislative act at issue in Grimes was 
titled “Municipal Support of Public School Systems” while the legislative act 
at issue in Vasquez was titled “Employee Injury Benefit Act.” Id. 
90. Id. ¶ 18, 381 P.3d at 772. 
91. Id. ¶ 18, 381 P.3d at 773. 
92. Id. ¶ 28, 381 P.3d at 774. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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relying on the interests of employers in reducing compensation 
costs.”95 The Court then analyzed whether or not a general law is 
impossible due to certain circumstances or if the goals of the 
legislation could be accomplished by a general law.96 Finally, once the 
Vasquez Court determined that the OEIBA was a special law, it 
looked to see if the law was “substantially and reasonably related to a 
legitimate government objective” so it could survive a constitutional 
challenge.97 
The Vasquez Court further held that the OEIBA allows for em-
ployers to treat their employees inequitably when compared with em-
ployees who fall under the AWCA.98 Under the OEIBA, employers are 
not bound by the provisions of the AWCA for the “purpose of: 
defining covered injuries; medical management; dispute resolution or 
other process; funding; notices; or penalties” unless there is 
incorporation of the AWCA’s standard into the OEIBA.99 The 
OEIBA clearly stated that “no other provision of the Administrative 
Workers’ Compensation Act defining covered injuries, medical 
management, dispute resolution or other process, funding, notices or 
penalties shall apply or otherwise be controlling under the Oklahoma 
Employee Injury Benefit Act, unless expressly incorporated.”100 The 
OEIBA ensured that injured employees under the OEIBA would not 
receive the same protection of procedures as employees covered by the 
AWCA.101 
The OEIBA failed in Oklahoma due to the already existing mand-
atory state-run workers’ compensation program. In Texas, however, 
there was never a mandatory system of workers’ compensation. The 
challenges faced in Oklahoma in implementing a new system creating 
a different class of workers are likely to be experienced in other states 
considering opt-out programs. Unlike in Texas, Oklahoma never 
incorporated a provision to allow for equalization of bargaining by 
permitting the employee to opt out of the alternative program and 
instead sue in court for damages. Given the continued national 
onslaught on compensation benefits through benefit cuts and opt-out 
legislation, perhaps the great equalizer would be to give the injured 
 
95. Id. ¶ 29, 381 P.3d at 774 (citing Torres v. Seaboard Foods, LLC., 2016 OK 
20, ¶ 47, 373 P.3d 1057, 1079 (2016)). 
96. Id. ¶¶ 31–32, 381 P.3d at 774–75.  
97. Id. ¶ 28, 381 P.3d at 774.  
98. Id. ¶ 19, 381 P.3d at 773. 
99. Id. ¶ 22, 381 P.3d at 773. 
100. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85A, § 203(b) (West 2015). 
101. Vasquez, ¶ 28, 381 P.3d at 774. 
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worker back the right to sue for damages and recover more than the 
paltry sum often guaranteed for injured workers. 
III. Opting Out in Texas 
Unlike the rest of the United States, Texas never had a 
mandatory system of state-run workers’ compensation. Under Texas 
law, an employer has the option to join the traditional workers’ 
compensation system with oversight by the Texas Department of 
Insurance102 or they can opt out of the statutory system and create a 
“non-subscription” program, but would lose the exclusive remedy 
provision and could become liable “for work related injuries under 
common law principles of negligence,”103 although they would gain 
certain freedoms and advantages from state oversight.104 Non-
subscribers could thus become liable to injured workers and be forced 
to pay high awards if found negligent since they lose immunity from 
lawsuits.105 If a Texas employer choses to subscribe to the workers’ 
compensation system, then it can either buy an insurance policy 
through a company licensed by the Texas Department of Insurance, 
obtain certification from the DWC to self-insure any compensation 
claims, join an approved self-insurance group, or be a self-insured 
government entity.106 Most of the non-subscriber plans are governed 
under the Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), which allows for more freedom for employers than tradi-
tional state-run plans.107 These opt-out plans greatly affect the statu-
torily defined benefits for injured workers, state measures that are de-
signed to ensure that injured workers receive benefits, the use of state 
administrative or civil courts in disputes, and the exclusive remedy 
which was part of the original grand bargain.108 
 
102. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.002(a) (West 2016). 
103. Brookshire Bros., Inc. v. Lewis, 997 S.W.2d 908, 912 (Tex. App. 1999) 
(holding that Brookshire is a “nonsubscriber under the Texas workers’ 
compensation law. . . . [and] is responsible for work-related injuries under 
common law principles of negligence”); see also Werner v. Colwell, 909 
S.W.2d 866, 868 (Tex. 1995). 
104. Information for Workers’ Compensation Non-subscribers, Tex. Dep’t of 
Ins., https://www.tdi.texas.gov/wc/employer/cb007.html [https://perma.cc/ 
W3JA-4NRR] (last updated Feb. 24, 2017). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. New St. Grp., Workers’ Compensation Opt-Out: Can 
Privatization Work? 8 (2012), 
https://www.sedgwick.com/NewsRelease/WCOpt-OutStudy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CM62-YRV8].  
108. Id. at 6. 
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These alternative policies are touted as a less costly option for the 
employer typically because they have a specific policy and benefit 
limits for employees.109 Costs were often kept lower than through 
workers’ compensation due to not covering partial, total, or 
permanent total disabilities; medical benefits limited to two years 
rather than lifetime coverage; capped death benefits; and per-person 
or per-event capped limits on benefits.110 As of 2012, about one-third 
of Texas employers were non-subscribers.111 This number is almost the 
lowest it has been according to a study spanning nearly two 
decades,112 but this had not diminished other states’ interest in the 
non-subscription option.113 Interestingly, the greatest number of non-
subscribers employed fewer than five employees.114 A 2012 study 
revealed that fifteen percent of non-subscribers were primarily 
concerned with the high costs of insurance premiums.115 The same 
primary financial concerns were echoed by large non-subscribing 
companies in 2012.116 Another 2012 study, however, revealed that 
more often than not, subscribing employers did not experience a 
change in their premium.117 
 
109. Id. 
110. Id. at 15 (citing Alison Morantz, Opting Out of Workers’ Compensation in 
Texas: A Survey of Large, Multistate Nonsubscribers, in Regulation vs. 
Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law 197 (Daniel 
Kessler ed., 2010). 
111. Workers’ Comp. Research & Evaluation Grp., Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 
Employer Participation in the Texas Workers’ Compensation 
System: 2012 Estimates 6 (2012), https://www.tdi.texas.gov/reports/ 
wcreg/documents/2012_Nonsub.pdf [https://perma.cc/HXU5-CXWA]. 
112. See id. The first study of the percentage of Texas non-subscribers was in 
1993. The 1993 study showed that forty-four percent of employers were 
non-subscribers. In 2010, this number dipped down to an all-time low of 
thirty-two percent. This number increased in 2012 to thirty-three percent 
of employers. Id. 
113. See supra note 11 and accompanying text (noting the increased support for 
alternative opt-out programs). 
114. Workers’ Comp. Research & Evaluation Grp., Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 
supra note 111, at 8. 
115. Id. at 13. Other primary reasons given were too few employees, workers’ 
compensation was not mandatory, high medical costs, and few on-the-job 
injuries. Id. 
116. Id. at 14. Non-subscribing employers with 500 or more employees were pri-
marily concerned with high insurance premiums (twenty-three percent) and 
high medical costs within the workers’ compensation system (twenty-four 
percent). Id. 
117. Id. at 16. 
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Texas, however, retained the right for an employee to sue for 
common law tort damages if their employer elected to opt out of the 
workers’ compensation system, even if the employer opted to purchase 
alternative coverage.118 Employers that opted out of the typical 
system can be sued under tort law and lose their right to common law 
defenses, which includes key defenses that were used prior to the 
introduction of workers’ compensation laws in the early 1900s.119 For 
example, under Texas law, an employer loses the defense of 
contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, or that the injury or 
death was caused by a negligent co-worker.120 In order to avoid 
liability, the employer must show that the employee was solely 
responsible for their injury.121 
If an employee does sue the employer for civil damages, their 
ability to recover from the employer is often limited by the opt-out 
plans which typically do not cover attorney’s fees, judgments for pain 
and suffering, or punitive damages.122 If the employer decides to 
provide the employee with an alternative benefit plan after they opted 
out of the state system, then the employer can require that the 
employee waive their right to sue in tort and instead submit to 
arbitration.123 Traditionally, Texas law prohibited an employee from 
preemptively waiving their right to sue an employer.124 Prior to 2001, 
Texas employers that opted out often required employees to waive 
their rights to sue for future injuries as a condition to employment, 
thereby limiting an employers’ future risk related to an employee’s 
ability to recover in tort.125 Concerns arose that employees were being 
 
118. Tex. Dep’t of Ins., supra note 104. 
119. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(a)(1-3) (West 2016) (“In an action 
against an employer . . . who is not covered by workers’ compensation insur-
ance obtained in the manner authorized by Section 406.003 . . . it is not a 
defense that: the employee was guilty of contributory negligence; the 
employee assumed the risk of injury or death; or the injury or death was 
caused by the negligence of a fellow employee.”). 
120. Id. 
121. See New St. Grp., supra note 107, at 14 (“Texas courts have interpreted 
the removal of the contributory negligence defense to mean that employers 
must prove that employees are solely responsible for their injury to escape 
liability.”). 
122. See Tex. Dep’t of Ins., supra note 104 (explaining that non-subscribers 
do not enjoy the limited liability subscribers enjoy and may be liable for 
damages for pain and suffering, as well as legal expenses). 
123. See Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(e)–(f) (West 2016). 
124. See New St. Grp., supra note 107, at 14. 
125. Jason Ohana, Note, Texas Elective Workers’ Compensation: A Model of 
Innovation?, 2 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 323, 342 (2011). Ohana asserts 
that by waiving negligence claims before employment began, the employer 
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taken advantage of since they were not injured at the time they 
signed the contract and so were unlikely to consult with attorneys 
who could evaluate the arbitration agreement.126 In 2001, the Texas 
legislature attempted to limit the potential for abuse by an employer 
who required employees to waive their rights to litigate for future 
claims.127 
Following 2001’s legislative reform, a preemptive waiver to litigate 
future injuries became theoretically unenforceable in Texas courts. In 
spite of the legislative reform, employers found a way around this 
legal hurdle by requiring employees to sign arbitration agreements 
usually before an injury occurred.128 By 2012, fourteen percent of non-
subscribing employers required employees to agree to resolve disputes 
by arbitration.129 Ninety percent of non-subscribers required 
employees to sign the arbitration agreement prior to employment 
before any possible work-related injury could occur.130 Injured 
employees brought suit alleging that arbitration agreements violated 
Texas law. However, Texas courts consistently held that the Federal 
Arbitration Act preempts the Texas statutory prohibition.131 
 
could calculate possible negligence and benefits claims with a great degree 
of accuracy. The employer would know what remedy employees could utilize, 
thus lowering employers’ costs. An employer would provide employees with 
an “often inferior benefits package” because the employer required 
prospective employees to waive the rights that would have been waived 
under a state-run workers’ compensation system. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. Id. at 342–43 (citing Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 406.033(e) (West 2009)). 
128. Id. at 343–44. 
129. Workers’ Comp. Research & Evaluation Grp., Tex. Dep’t of Ins., 
supra note 111, at 32. The number of employers requiring arbitration 
increased from nine percent in 2010. Id. 
130. Id. This number was at ninety percent as of 2012 and was ninety-eight per-
cent in 2010. Id. 
131. In re Bison Bldg. Materials, Ltd., Nos. 01-07-00003-CV, 01-07-00029-CV, 
2008 WL 2548568, at *10 (Tx. Ct. App. June 26, 2008) (“We . . . now hold 
that the FAA preempts any potential application of the Texas non-waiver 
provision stated in Labor Code section 406.033€ to prevent enforcement of 
the arbitration clause stated in the [p]lan.”); In re Border Steel, Inc., 229 
S.W.3d 825, 832 (Tx. Ct. App. 2007) (“The Texas Labor Code provides that 
any agreement by an employee to waive a cause of action or any right des-
cribed in section 406.033(a), which is executed before the employee’s injury 
or death, is void and unenforceable. We have already determined that the 
provisions of the FAA are applicable to this case, based on Border Steel’s 
interstate activities. Therefore, the FAA preempts the application of the 
Texas non-waiver provision to prevent the enforcement of the Arbitration 
Agreement at issue here.”); In re R & R Pers. Specialists of Tyler, Inc., 146 
S.W.3d 699, 703–04 (Tx. Ct. App. 2004) (“Consequently, the FAA pre-
empts state statutes to the extent they are inconsistent with that Act . . . 
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Therefore, the Texas statue preventing employees from waiving rights 
over future injuries was rendered ineffective through arbitration 
agreements prior to employment. The rights of injured employees to 
compensation benefits continues to be eroded through arbitration 
agreements signed prior to injuries. Employees are unlikely to 
understand the significance of what they are signing and are in an 
inherently unequal bargaining position since they would likely need 
the employment more than their employer needs them. 
IV. The Feasibility of Emulating Opt-Out Acts in 
States with Constitutional Provisions 
It is easy to lose focus on who workers’ compensation was 
originally designed to protect when viewing workers’ compensation 
plans solely through a financial lens. States created constitutional 
provisions to enact workers’ compensation provisions; unfortunately, 
workers’ compensation benefits have not kept up with inflation or the 
rising costs of living.132 The debate surrounding workers’ 
compensation cuts intensified nationally, affecting more states than 
just Oklahoma and Texas. In August 2014, a Florida Circuit Judge 
held Florida’s system of workers’ compensation to be unconstitutional 
in Cortes v. Velda Farms.133 The Cortes Court held the exclusive 
remedy provision of the Florida workers’ compensation act to be 
invalid and unconstitutional because it failed to provide for a 
“reasonable alternative remedy to the tort remedy it supplanted.”134 
The Court in Cortes supported its holding by analyzing how the 
Legislature repealed numerous benefits since 1968, “including 
permanent partial disability without replacing any of them with 
equivalent benefits.”135 The Cortes Court concluded that to pass 
constitutional muster the exclusive replacement remedy must provide 
for significant benefits to the injured worker.136 However, “without full 
medical care or indemnity for permanent partial loss of wage earning 
capacity,” the Florida workers’ compensation act failed to provide a 
reasonable alternative than originally existed in tort law.137 
 
We conclude that the FAA preempts the application of the nonwaiver pro-
vision to prevent or restrict enforcement of the arbitration provisions at issue 
here.”). 
132. Jack B. Hood et al., Workers’ Compensation and Employee Pro-
tection Laws in a Nutshell 89 (6th ed. 2016). 
133. No. 11-13661, 2014 WL 6685226 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Aug. 13, 2014). 
134. Id. at *10. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at *9. 
137. Id. at *10. 
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Cortes and Vasquez are just two examples of many of the states’ 
recent attempts at limiting workers’ compensation benefits at the ex-
pense of the injured worker without providing for some form of alter-
native remedy in exchange for the rights injured workers surrendered 
years ago in the “grand bargain.” Compensation benefits are not uni-
form across the United States, so workers in some states experience 
greater benefits and protections while others struggle to survive on 
benefits that keep them well below the poverty line.138 Benefits vary 
greatly between neighboring states so that an amputated arm in one 
state is worth $45,000, but in a neighboring state it is worth nearly 
three-quarters of a million dollars.139 The disparity for injuries is so 
great that in Illinois a lost testicle is worth nearly $100,000, but in 
Minnesota a testicle is worth less than $5,000.140 The constant 
chipping away of benefits by state legislatures allows for two men who 
were injured on the job in neighboring states to have vastly different 
outcomes. 
Jeremy Lewis’s and Josh Potter’s stories are remarkably similar, 
yet have strikingly different consequences. Both men were in their 20s 
when they were injured on the job at southern industrial plants and 
each lost part of their left arms.141 Lewis was awarded $45,000 in 
workers’ compensation, while Potter’s total benefits will exceed 
$740,000 during his lifetime.142 The difference in total amounts of 
benefits received for a comparable injury is due to Potter losing his 
arm in Georgia while Lewis was injured in Alabama, only fifty miles 
from the Georgia line.143 Due to Alabama’s minimal workers’ 
compensation benefits, Jeremy Lewis’s life took a downward spiral 
 
138. Michael Grabell, U.S. Labor Department: States Are Failing Injured 




140. Lena Groeger, Michael Grabell, ProPublica, & Cynthia Cotts, Workers 
Comp Benefits: How Much is a Limb Worth?, ProPublica (Mar. 5, 2015), 
https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/workers-compensation-benefits-by-
limb [https://perma.cc/33XJ-V2EW] (select “Testicle” from drop-down 
menu listing body parts) (explaining that as of 2015, the maximum compen-
sation for one testicle in Illinois is $73,537 but in Minnesota one testicle is 
worth $3,750 in workers’ compensation benefits). 
141. Michael Grabell & Howard Berkes, How Much Is Your Arm Worth? 




143. Id. See also Groeger, Grabell, ProPublica & Cotts, supra note 140 
(depicting the cost of a limb state-by-state). 
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after he lost his arm. Lewis claims that after his injury he “lost 
everything” that he owned from his three-bedroom home in a new 
development to his three new cars.144 Lewis then had no other option 
but to move his family into a “rundown singlewide trailer on the 
outskirts of town.”145 Lewis’s tragic story is but one of many injured 
workers for whom the workers’ compensation failed them. Workers’ 
compensation benefits are now at the lowest in decades since the 
1970s and are not providing for injured workers in the way that the 
program was originally designed.146 
Opt-out proponents argue that opt-out provisions will keep costs 
low without cutting benefits for injured workers. Supporters cite 
Texas as a model for other states. A 2016 study showed that Texas 
has one of the most affordable workers’ compensation coverage 
whereas Alabama’s compensation rates, despite its limited 
compensation benefits plan, are higher than Texas’s.147 Despite its 
flaws, the Texas system can provide a model for other states to follow 
when constructing opt-out systems. The Cortes Court summarized the 
challenge to workers’ compensation seen nationally—multiple classes 
of benefits that were eliminated and cut back without replacing them 
with anything.148 Injured workers are no longer receiving what they 
originally contracted for and the “grand bargain” has become 
distinctly one sided. Under the Texas system, workers can opt out of 
alternative coverage and instead retain the right to sue in tort.149 The 
biggest challenge for other states seeking to implement some form of 
alternative benefit plan is the same issue faced by Oklahoma, which 
led to a constitutional challenge over the creation of two classes of 
workers singled out for disparate treatment. 
Opt-out plans have significant setbacks to the rights of injured 
workers that should be carefully evaluated when states decide whether 
or not to implement a form of opt-out plans like in Texas. For 
example, opt-out plans usually have a shortened time frame for 
 
144. Grabell & Berkes, supra note 141.  
145. Id. 
146. Id. 
147. Don Jergler, Report Shows California and New Jersey Have Highest 
Workers’ Comp Rates, Ins. J. (Oct. 18, 2016), 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/ 
news/national/2016/10/18/429683.htm [https://perma.cc/FC63-3DRS]. 
148. Cortes v. Velda Farms, No. 11-13661, 2014 WL 6685226, *8–9 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
Aug. 13, 2014). 
149. Stephanie K. Jones, Opting Out of Texas Workers’ Comp Doesn’t Have to 
Mean Going Bare, Ins. J. (June 5, 2014), http://www.insurancejournal 
.com/news/southcentral/2014/06/05/330945.htm [https://perma.cc/ZPJ3-
UKHB]. 
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reporting injuries.150 In Texas, injured workers covered under opt-out 
plans are required to report workplace injuries in twenty-four hours 
versus the typical thirty days required by most state-run programs.151 
Additionally, medical coverage is often limited in terms of length.152 
Non-subscribing employers can also have less state oversight than 
employers enrolled in traditional plans and employers can terminate 
benefits under opt-out plans if the employees do not follow the 
guidelines.153 In 2015, NPR and ProPublica looked into 120 companies 
who set up their own injury benefit plans under the OEIBA and 
compared them with traditional state-run programs. In this study, 
they found that employers were able to pay workers far less under 
OEIBA than they would under traditional workers’ compensation 
plans.154 
Conclusion 
Texas’s opt-out plan can provide a model for other states, parti-
cularly in light of the way multiple state legislatures chipped away at 
benefits for injured workers over the years. While the Texas model is 
a far from perfect solution to the rising costs and limited benefits, 
portions of the system could work in other states even if they have 
existing constitutional provisions for state-run workers’ compensation 
systems. The great fault in the OEIBA was due to the creation of two 
disparate groups of employees. However, like the Cortes Court held, 
the existing system has left the workers’ compensation system to be a 
mere shadow of itself and nothing more than a “pathway to poverty 
for the injured worker.”155 Perhaps a viable solution would be to 
 
150. Suzzanne W. Decker & Nicole K. Whitecar, Opt-Out Workers’ 
Compensation Plans Could be a Beneficial Option, Miles & Stockbridge 






154. Grabell & Berkes, supra note 11 (explaining that Costco, a non-subscriber, 
paid $15,000 for an amputated finger, but Wal-Mart paid $25,000 for the 
same amputated finger). 
155. Howard Berkes, Labor Secretary Calls Workers’ Comp Opt-Out Plans a 
‘Pathway to Poverty,’ NPR (Mar. 25, 2016, 1:29 PM), http://www.npr.org/ 
sections/thetwo-way/2016/03/25/471849458/labor-secretary-calls-workers-
comp-opt-out-plans-a-pathway-to-poverty [https://perma.cc/6RCY-MHZW] 
(explaining that former Labor Secretary Thomas Perez confirmed an in-
vestigation into opt-out programs that saved millions of dollars but created 
a “pathway to poverty” for injured workers). 
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incorporate a provision to allow for injured workers’ to opt out of 
either the traditional workers’ compensation system or the opt-out 
programs and instead sue for civil monetary damages. Although suing 
in tort is riskier than accepting a predetermined, albeit limited, set of 
monetary awards, few injured workers are able to support themselves 
with a decent quality of life under existing workers’ compensation 
systems throughout the United States. 
The Texas legislature already eliminated common law defenses for 
negligence including assumption of the risk, negligence of a co-worker, 
and contributory negligence. This, too, is an equalizer for injured em-
ployees. If this were expanded into other states, then perhaps more 
employers would be concerned about liability due to the elimination 
of commonly used defenses and expand benefits under opt-out plans 
to avoid tort liability. The system that has arisen today has left 
significant room for improvement and expansion with regards to 
treatment for injured workers. On the other hand, if employers were 
to adopt alternative benefit plans that have shown a reduction in 
costs to employers than employers may be more inclined to implement 
opt-out programs. Finally, the Texas system permits arbitration 
agreements prior to employment, which include a waiver for any 
future injuries since this is governed under federal law, thus, 
preempting existing Texas statutes. For future states, this could 
present a significant problem to alternative opt-out plans since it 
would hinder states’ ability to limit potential abuse to employees 
through statutory law. The Texas system has significant flaws; 
however, in light of expanding restrictions on workers’ compensation 
benefits, perhaps the Texas model can provide legislatures with a 
feasible template in constructing opt-out legislation in the future. 
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